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Cicero, On Invention 1.51-77
H ypothetical Syllogistic and the Early Peripatetics
by W illiam W. Fortenbaugh
Rutgers U niversity
I
In On Invention, a youthful work w ritten perhaps as early as 90 B.C.
and alm ost certainly no later than 80 B .C .,1 Cicero discusses confirm ation
o r proof (confirmatio). The discussion begins with a survey o f various
sources from which arguments may drawn (1.34-43). A fter that arguments
are classified as necessary or probable (1.44-50).2 Finally Cicero considers
tw o ways in which arguments proceed: either inductively o r deductively
(1.51-77). The treatm ent o f induction is com paratively sh o rt It runs six
sections (1.51-6) and divides into several parts. H ere are the parts in
outline.3
1. An initial statement concerning the procedure o f induction (1.51)
2. A n example taken from a dialogue o f A eschines (1.51-2)
3. M ention o f Socrates as a frequent practioner (1.53)
4. Four precepts concerning the use o f inductive argum ent (1.53-4)
5. A n analysis o f induction into three parts (1.54)
6. A n example based on the trial o f Epam inondas (1.55-6)
The treatm ent of deduction is not dissim ilar,4 but it is longer, running a full
tw enty-one sections (1.57-77). It, too, divides into parts.
1. An initial statement concerning the procedure o f deduction (1.57)
2. Report o f competing analyses: one into five parts and another into
three; the analysis into five parts is set out in a lengthy example
concerning the administration o f the universe (1.57-60)

1 All scholars agree that On Invention is an early work of Cicero’s, but how early is
not certain. Kennedy (1972) p. 107-10 suggests that it was written between 91 and 89
B.C., when Cicero was fifteen to seventeen years old. Achard p. 5-10 argues for 84-3
B.C. and Kroll (1940) col. 1093 thinks the work may have been written as late as 80
B.C. For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to decide between these dates.
2 Strictly speaking 1.50 is a transitional section in which Cicero refers both to what
has been said concerning the discovery (invenire, inventio) of arguments from various
sources or topics (ex his locis) and to what will be said concerning the ways in which
arguments are advanced.
3 In dividing the treatments of induction and deduction into parts, I am not
suggesting that no other divisions are possible. Rather I offer divisions which are based
on the text and suit the purposes of this paper.
4 Several similarities between the treatment of induction and that of deduction are
clear from the outlines. Each begins with a statement concerning the procedure under
discussion (Ind. no. 1, Ded. no. 1). Philosophic predecessors are mentioned: Socrates for
induction and Aristotle and Theophrastus for deduction (Ind. no. 3, Ded. no. 3). There is
discussion of the number of parts into which each procedure divides (Ind. no. 5, Ded. no.
2-4). Each procedure is elucidated by examples; Epaminondas appears within an example
in both treatments (Ind. no. 2 and 6, Ded. no. 2 and 5).
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3. Endorsement o f the five part analysis: it has been adopted by all
who take their start from A ristotle and Theophrastus; a detailed
argument in support o f quinquepaitite analysis (1.61-6)
4. Summary overview o f the five parts (1.67)
5. Examples o f arguments having different numbers o f parts: not
only five and four parts—examples based on the trial o f
Epaminondas—but also three— an example concerning the
destruction of Carthage—and even two and one— exam ples based
on the woman who has given birth— (1.67-75)
6. Consideration o f the way an argum ent is handled, especially
variation in the order o f prem ises (L 75-6)
7. Recognition that philosophers offer many other analyses,
followed by the claim to have written about argum ent in oratory
more accurately and diligently than others (1.77)
In the course of this paper, I shall say some things about C icero’s
discussion o f induction, but my prim ary concern w ill be w ith his account o f
deduction. In particular, I want to call attention to C icero’s argum ent for a
quinquepaitite analysis of deductive reasoning (Ded. 3). It is rem arkable in
that it makes elaborate use o f the mixed hypothetical syllogism, and also of
some importance in that it supplements our evidence for early Peripatetic
interest in syllogisms o f this land. Recent scholarship on the history o f
ancient logic has generally focused on later sources— like A lexander of
A phrodisias, Boethius, Philoponus and Sim plicius5— and pointed to
Theophrastus as a significant contributor to the developm ent o f hypothetical
syllogistic.6 Cicero, writing three centuries before Alexander, seems not
only to confirm the importance o f Theophrastus but also to indicate that his
contributions were recognized as such by H ellenistic rhetoricians. In
presenting this thesis, I shall not be accepting C icero’s claim to have written
more accurately and diligently than others (Ded. 7), but I w ill suggest that
the argument in favor of quinquepaitite analysis (Ded. 3) is more coherent
than what precedes (Ded. 2) and that this difference is largely attributable to
C icero’s use of sources.
Π
The discussion of induction begins (Ind. 1) with a brief statem ent
concerning the procedure. It is said to be “an argum ent which, through
m atters not in doubt, gains the assent o f the person with whom one is
arguing; and by this assent it wins his approval of a certain doubful m atter
because o f a similarity to those m atters to which he has assented” (1.51).7
The fundamental idea here is not in doubt: by adducing parallel cases which
are different but similar, we establish the truth o f w hatever concerns us.8
5 Alexander’s floruit is 200 A.D.; Boethius’ dates are c. 480-524; Philoponus and
Simplicius were both active in the sixth century A.D.
6 See now the article (1985) by Jonathan Barnes. Interest in Peripatetic contributions
to the development of the hypothetical syllogism has a long history. I mention only Carl
Prantl and William and Martha Kneale, whose influential books were written in 1855 and
1962 respectively.
7 1.51: inductio est oratio, quae rebus non dubiis captat assensionem eius, quicum
instituía est; quibus assensionibusfacit, ut Uli dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem
earum rerum, quibus assensit, probetur.
8 See, e.g., Schweinfurth-Walla p. 147.
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For the sake o f clarity, Cicero follow s this statem ent w ith an exam ple (Ind.
2), in which Socrates reports a converstadon between A spasia on the one
hand and Xenophon and his wife on the other.9 A spasia first gets
X enophon’s w ife to agree that she w ould prefer her neighbor’s jew elry,
clothing and other finery, should they be better than her ow n, and then asks
w hether she would prefer her neighbor’s husband, should he be a better
man than her own husband. X enophon’s w ife responds by blushing, for
she understands that her earlier admissions constitute an inductive argument
leading to the conclusion that she would prefer her neighbor’s husband,
should he, like the other item s, prove better. A spasia then puts sim ilar
questions to Xenophon with the same result. She concludes that both
husband and w ife want the very best spouse. U nless they can bring it about
that no better spouses exists in the w orld, they w ill alw ays feel the lack o f
those they think best (1.51-2).
The example is clear and well illustrates what the initial statement
concerning induction is intended to convey: through sim ilar cases one
establishes a different and doubtful m atter. I offer only tw o comments.
First, the example helps us understand a detail in the initial statem ent. I am
referring to the use of the singular in reference to the person with whom one
is arguing.10 The singular suggests that the statem ent is oriented more
toward dialectic than public oratory, and that im pression is confirm ed by the
example o f Aspasia questioning first Xenophon’s w ife and then Xenophon
him self.11 Second, this orientation tow ard dialectic fits the subsequent list
o f precepts (Ind. 4): most especially the third precept which w arns against
disclosing where one’s questions are leading, and the fourth precept
concerning possible moves, should the respondent deny or refuse to answ er
die final question (1.54). Such recom m endations concern winning strategy
and appear aimed at classroom exercises. They are not, however, directly
relevant to the logical structure o f inductive argum ent That structure is
unaffected by premature disclosure and obstinance on the part o f the
respondent.
The account o f deduction, like that o f induction, opens w ith a statement
o f the procedure (Ded. 1): Deduction is said to be uan argum ent which
draws something probable from the m atter itself, and when this is set forth
and exam ined in itself, it confirm s itself by its own force and reasoning”
(1.57).12 This statem ent is intended to establish a contrast w ith induction. A
deductive argument, unlike an inductive one, does not adduce sim ilar but
different cases; rather it draws a conclusion “from the m atter itself.”13 W hat
Cicero means by “from the m atter itse lf’ is clear from earlier rem arks within
the discussion o f proof, i.e„ from w hat C icero says concerning the
discovery o f arguments (1.34-43)14 and their classification as either
9 The example is taken from the lost dialogue Aspasia, written by the Socratic
Aeschines = V IA fir. 70.4-26 (vol. 2 p. 615 Giannantoni).
10 1.51 eius, quicum ... i ll i ....
11 Cf. 1.55, where Cicero feels constrained to give an example which is oratorical (it
is based on the trial of Epaminondas).
12 1.57: ratiocinatio est oratio ex ipsa re probabile aliquid elide ns, quod exposition
et per se cognition sua se vi et ratione confirmet.
13 Schweinfurth-Walla p. 155, Achard p. 107 n. 166.
14 An argument is discovered (invention) by searching (quaerere) the various topics
(loci) surveyed in 1.34-43. For invenire, quaerere, and locus see 1.38,44,50. On 1.50,
see above note 2.
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necessary or probable (1.44-50). An argum ent like “If she has given birth,
she has lain with a man” (1.44) is based,on cause and effect (1.37), and one
like “If I was abroad when the m urder occurred, I did not com m it the
m urder” (1.45) is based on the location o f the act in question (1.38). In each
o f these examples, the argument is com pleted by assum ing (or establishing)
tiie truth o f the antecedent: “In fact she has given birth” and “In fact I was
abroad.” In neither is proof accomplished by adducing sim ilar cases. The
tw o exam ples recur within the discussion o f deduction (1.72,74 and 1.63
respectively) and are typical o f the deductive arguments under discussion by
Cicero. Formally they are m ixed hypothetical syllogisms o f the if-then
variety: “If P, then Q; but P; therefore Q .”15
I shall have more to say about such syllogism s before concluding this
part o f my paper, but first I want to call attention to the fact that the initial
statement concerning deduction is not immediately followed by an example,
as is the case with induction. Instead, Cicero speaks o f a controversy
between those who advocate a quinquepartite analysis o f deduction and
those who prefer a tripartite analysis. W e are told that the dispute does not
concern the actual practice o f oratory but rather how precepts ought to be
given.16 That sounds like a practical m atter in which pedagogical method is
the focus o f controversy, but Cicero quickly indicates that it is also (or has
become) a conceptual issue: W hile the one party says that there are five
parts, the other holds that it is not possible to divide deduction into more
than three parts?17 Cicero tells us that he is going to set out the controversy
along with the reasoning on both sides, but w hat follow s is not as
inform ative as might be hoped for. First, we get an exam ple o f
quinquepartite deduction without any statement concerning the reasons for
preferring five parts (1.58-9). A fter that comes a statem ent o f the reasons
for preferring three parts, but no exam ple is offered (1.60).
There is an imbalance here which may be explained in part by Cicero’s
youth. The work On Invention is a juvenile effort, so that infelicites are to
be expected. That is true enough, but it may not be the whole story. A s I see
it, Cicero has deliberately om itted the reasoning o f those advocating five
parts, because he wants to present their reasons as his own; and that is in
fact what happens. A fter completing his report concerning com peting
analyses (Ded. 2), Cicero m akes, as it w ere, a new start (Ded. 3), first
stating his preference for five parts and then saying that he m ust explain this
preference (1.61).18 W hat follows is a well structured argum ent intended to
15
There are, of course, other kinds of mixed hypothetical syllogisms. In Part IV of
this paper, I shall have occasion to consider the “separative” variety.
161.57 paululum in praecipiendi ratione dissenserunt.
17 1.57 nam partim quinqué eius partes esse dixerunt, partim non plus quam in tres
partes posse distribuí putaverunt.
18 1.61 quare autem nobis ilia magis partitio probe tur, dicendum videtur, ne temere
secuti putemur; et breviter dicendum, ne in huiusmodi rebus diutius, quam ratio
praecipiendi postulat, commoremur. “It seems necessary to say why I approve more of
that (five part) division, lest I be thought to adopt it recklessly. And I must speak briefly,
lest in matters of this kind I delay longer than is called for by the method of giving
rules.” In fairness to Cicero, it may obsevered that these words do not explicitly rule out
presenting an argument already advanced by others. But if Cicero is carefully choosing his
words, then he is being coy. For what is said allows us to believe—or more strongly,
encourages us to believe—-that he will speak for himself and on his own. And that is
certainly an impression which Cicero would welcome. Cf. 1.50, where Cicero speaks of
the negligence of those who write Artes; 1.77, where he claims to have written more
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demonstrate not only the possibility o f a five part analysis but also the
wrongness o f three part analysis.19 That is exactly w hat we expect to find,
but do not find, in Cicero’s report o f com peting analyses. I shall say more
about the argum ent for five parts in Part ΠΙ o f this paper. For the moment, I
w ant to stay with Cicero’s indal treatm ent o f the quinquepartite analysis.
Instead o f reporting the reasoning o f those who advocate five parts,
Cicero lists the parts they recognize together w ith an illustrative argument
concerning the order o f the universe (1.58-9). The advocates are referred to
each tim e a part is introduced (“they say,” “they think,” etc.), and the
number o f parts is emphasized by counting: “first,” “then,” “in the third
part,” “in the fourth place” and “in the fifth place.” That gives an appearance
o f order to Cicero’s remarks, but it cannot conceal certain difficulties. I
mention three, o f which the first tw o are closely related.
First, the technical terms by which the parts are known are not form ally
introduced. Rather they become clear in the course o f the discussion: the
first prem ise is called the proposition the proof o f this prem ise is the
propositionis approbation the second prem ise is the assumption its proof is
the assumptionis approbation and the conclusion is the complexio. A t risky
o f being fussy, I want to point out that using technical term s before defining
or explaining them may be confusing.20 Consider propositio. The term does
not occur where one expects to find it: i.e. at the very outset when the first
prem ise is introduced (1.58). Instead, it makes its appearance later when the
assumptio is introduced ( 1.59). That w ill create no difficulty for the
educated reader, but the tyro may be puzzled.21
carefully and diligently than others; and 2.8, where he speaks of making contributions on
his own (ex nostro). There may well be contributions by Cicero (see Achard p. 25-6); I
am, however, suggesting that the argument of 1.62-6 is not one.
19 Cf. 1.63 sin autem ita est,falsum est non esse plus quant tripertitam
argumentationem; “But if that is so, it is false that there is no argument of more than
three parts.” Both Hubei p. 107 and Achard p. 111 introduce (im)possibility into their
translations: “And if this is so, it is untrue that an argument can have no more than three
parts” and “Mais, s’il en est ainsi, il est faux de dire que l’argumentation ne peut
comporter plus de trois parties.” Whether or not esse here implies possibility, the
translations correctly reflect the position taken by the advocates of tripartite analysis. See
note 17.
20 The author of the Rhetoric to Herennius, probably Comificius, does better than
Cicero in that he begins his discussion of five part argumentation with a list of the parts
followed by a brief explanation of each (2.28). The illustrative argument comes later
(2.28-30). It may be that Cicero’s source was organized in a similar way, and that Cicero
moved the overview of parts to its present position (Ded. 4 = 1.67) when he took over the
argument for five parts and made it his own (as I believe he did). But having said that, I
do not want to suggest that the Rhetoric to Herennius is in other respects useful for
interpreting On Invention, In particular, the five parts set forth are not the same as those
found in On Invention, and attempts to relate them must fail (pace Matthes p. 206).
Clearest is the fourth part, exornatio. It is said to be used for the sake of adornment and
enrichment, once the argument has been established (2.28). That hardly fits On Invention,
for there each of the parts is conceived of as a step in the argument None is recommended
for use after the argument has been completed.
21 The Kneales p. 177-8 tell us that "Cicero did a useful service by inventing Latin
equivalents for Greek technical terms." As an example, they cite propositio and refer to
1.57ff. That may be correct, but the fact that propositio occurs first in 1.59 and without
explanation suggests to me that it was already a terminus technicus, at least in Cicero's
"classroom." It is used more formally in 1.67, but there Cicero has concluded the
argument for quinquepartite analysis and is surveying the resulting five parts. He appears
to be following his source and/or teacher closely and not introducing new terms.
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Second, when the first o f the five parts is introduced, it is described
sim ply as the “the summit (summa) o f the argum ent” (1.58);22 and when
the third part is introduced, we are told “to add it from the force o f the
propositio (ex vi propositions)” (1.59).23 Again, the beginner may be
puzzled. We can, however, find clarification in the later overview o f parts
(Ded. 4). For there the propositio is said to be that “which briefly sets forth
the source, from w hich the entire force (ex quo vis omnis) o f the argum ent
ought to flow ,”24 and the asswnptio is characterized as that “through which
one assumes what is pertinent to showing (or proving the case), (deriving
it) from the propositio (ex propositione)” (1.67).25 Both the later passage,
the overview, and the earlier one, the description o f parts, are concerned
with the hypothetical syllogism: i.e., the m ixed hypothetical like “If P, then
Q; but P; therefore Q.” In such a syllogism , the propositio does contain the
“summit” and “force” of the argument: i f the antecedent is granted, then the
consequent follows.26 A nd the assw nptio is taken “from the propositio”
with a change.27 W hat was the antecedent in the conditional prem ise is
asserted categorically in the asswnptio. So much is clear, but it rem ains
opaque how die parts relate to the illustrative argument concerning the order
o f the universe. For this example is not set out as a hypothetical syllogism;
in fact its structure has become a m atter o f scholarly discussion.28
Third and last, the advocates o f five parts are said to think that the first
prem ise o f a deductive argum ent should be proven “by a variety o f reasons
and with the greatest possible fullness o f expression.”29 In a rhetorical
22 1.58 aiunt primum convenire exponere summam argumenationis.
23 1.59 aiunt, quod ostendere velis, id ex vi propositionis oportere assumere.
24 1.67 propositio, per quam locus is breviter exponitur ex quo vis omnis oportet
entartet ratiocihationis. I have translated locus here with “source” in order to strengthen
the connection with ex quo: “from which” flows the force of the argument Alternatively,
“topic” might be preferred, since it may remind us of the earlier survey of loci in 1.34-43.
We are to search through the loci in order to find an argument after which the argument
is fleshed out by stating the second premise, the asswnptio, and the conclusion.
25 1.67 asswnptio, per quam id, quod ex proposition ad ostendum perinet,
assumitur
26 In the categorical syllogism, the major premise does not contain the entire force
(omnis vis) of the argument. Two premises including a middle term are needed before the
power of the argument is revealed.
27 See Prantl vol. 1 p. 383-5 on μεταλαμβάνειν and μετάληψις.
28 For an interesting attempt to elucidate Cicero’s argument by introducing modem
notation, see Schweinfurth-Walla p. 158. She correctly observes that Cicero has given
little thought to the logic of the illustrative example. His concern is with the number of
parts. The same can be said of the later (1.68-9) example of quinquepartite deduction (i.e.,
the first illustrative argument in Ded. 5). It is based on the well known trial of
Epaminondas (stock material: see the example of induction in 1.55-6 = Ind. 6, as well as
that of four part deduction in 1.70) and satisfies the earlier call for fullness of expression
in the propositionis approbatio (1.68 satisfying the recommendation of 1.58, on which
see the next paragraph). Nevertheless, Cicero seems quite unconcerned with logical
clarity. The propositio (1.68) needs to be reformulated, and the asswnptio (1.69) is so
unclear that scholars disagree where it is stated in the argument (see Kroll p. 4 and Achard
p. 114 n.181 versus Schweinfurth-Walla p. 159-60, with whom I agree). My point is not
that Cicero’s argument is hopelessly confused. It is rather that Cicero is not interested in
logical structure. He is more concerned with elaborating the approbations, thereby
emphasizing those parts which turn a three part argument into one of five parts. See
Klein col. 1253-4.
29 1.58 rationibus variis et quam copiosissimis verbis.

context such a recommendation may be in place. In fact, it m ay be thought
to pick up and underline an earlier rem ark in C icero's discussion o f proof:
“The embellishment o f an argument, once it has been discovered, and the
dividing o f it into definite parts are (tasks) most agreeable (to the audience)
and especially necessary” (1.50).30 B ut having said that, I w ant to underline
its irrelevance within the particular context The recom m endation throws no
light on the logical structure o f the illustrative argument, and has no direct
relationship to the question at issue: five parts as against three. Indeed, an
advocate o f five parts m ight w ell reject fullness o f expression in favor o f
brevity, or claim that either one may be desirable depending on the
situation.31
ΙΠ
A fter reporting the competing analyses (Ded. 2), Cicero combines
history and personal preference (Ded. 3). H e declares him self in favor o f
the quinquepartite analysis and tells us that this analysis has been adopted
by those who follow A ristotle and Theophrastus. H e adds that his
preference must be explained, lest he be thought hasty in opting for five
parts (1.61). W hat follows is an explanation or argum ent in three steps
(L 62-6), whose m ost striking feature is the use o f m ixed hypothetical
syllogism s o f the if-then variety.
Steps I (1.62-3) and Π (1.64-5) o f Cicero’s explanation are not only
elaborate m ixed hypothetical syllogism s, but each o f the steps also
introduces a shorter hypothetical syllogism in order to illustrate an obvious
prem ise which needs no proof: i.e., it needs no approbation In both the
longer and shorter syllogisms, the m ajor divisions are clearly indicated: “i f '
(si) introduces the propositio; “but” (autem) m arks the assumption and
“therefore” (igitur) signals the com plexio32 Here are Steps I and Π in
outline.
Step I = Inv. 1.62-3
P ropositio: If 1) in some argum ent the propositio is sufficient
without an approbatio and 2) in another it is weak unless an
approbatio is added, then the approbatio is separate from the
propositio.

3 0 1.50 inventant (sc.argumentationem) exornan et certas in partes distinguí et
suavissimum est et summe necessarium. The remark is part of a transitional passage, on
which see above, note 2. The adjective suavissimum refers to the pleasure provided to the
listener, see Achard p. 102 n. 152.
31 L at» in the discussion of refutation (1.89), Cicero takes account of the fact that
orators may use many words to prove the propositio (deinde hoc approbant plurimis
verbis), because they think that many words produce forgetfulness. The example takes the
form of a mixed hypothetical syllogism: “If the inheritance was coming to him, it is
probable that he committed the murder; But the inheritance was coming to him; Therefore
he committed the murder.” Many words cause the listen»* to forget that the consequent in
the hypothetical premise was expressed as probable.
32 In Step I, the first statement of the complexio has igitur (1.62). When the
complexio is restated, igitur is replaced by ex hoc et ex eo (1.63). In Step II, igitur occurs
in both statements of the complexio (1.64,65). In neither of the shorter syllogisms is the
complexio expressed, for it is not in doubt and not directly relevant to the point at issue:
namely, the obviousness of one of the premises.
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P ro p o sitio n s appro batió: W hatever is able to be joined to and
separated from something cannot be the same as that to which it is
joined and from which it is separated
A ssum ptio: But 1) there is som e argum ent in which the propositio
does not need an approbation and 2) there is another in which the
proposito lacks force in d e absence o f an approbatio.
A ssu m p tio n s approbatio [postponed until after the com plexio
is stated]: 1) A propositio winch is obvious does not need an
approbation e.g., the propositio in the following argument:
Propositio: If I was in A thens on the day on w hich the
m urder was committed in Rome, I could not have been
involved in the murder.
A ssu m p tio : B ut I was in A thens on that day.
[Com plexio: Therefore I was not involved.33]
and 2) that a propositio may be in need of an approbatio is obvious
so that a demonstration would be pointless.
Com plexio [stated before and again after the assum ptions
approbatio] : Therefore the approbatio is something separate from the
pro p o sitio .
Step II = Inv. 1.64-5
Propositio: If 1) in some argum ent the assum ptio is sufficient
without an approbatio and 2) in another it is weak unless an
approbatio is added, then the approbatio is separate from the
assum ptio.
[P ro p o sitio n s approbatio: om itted34]
A ssum ptio: But 1) there is some argum ent in w hich the assum ptio
does not need an approbatio, and 2) there is another in which the
assumptio lacks force in the absence o f an approbatio.
A ssu m p tio n s approbatio [postponed until after the com plexio
is stated]: 1) An assumptio which is obvious does not need an
approbation e.g., the assumptio in the follow ing argument:
Propositio: If one ought to w ish to be w ise, it is fitting to
study philosophy.
A ssum ptio: But one ought to w ish to be wise.
[Complexio: Therefore it is fitting to study philosophy.35]
and 2) it is obvious that some assumptio needs on approbatio.
C om plexio [stated before and again after the assum ptions
approbatio]: Therefore the approbatio is separate from the
assumptio.
In contrast w ith Steps I and Π, Step ΠΙ (1.66) does not have a neatly
articulated hypothetical form. The opening words, “And from these
(arguments) the following is obvious,” 36 indicate dependence on the
preceding two Steps; and what comes next, “that there is some argum ent in
which neither the propositio nor the assumptio needs an approbation ’
combines parts o f the assum ptions o f Steps I and II. In particular, it
33 On the omission of the complexion see note 32.
34 The absence of the propositions approbatio in Step II is not significant The
propositions approbatio given in Step I holds for Step II and need not be repeated.
35 On the omission of the complexio, see note 32.
36 1.66 atque ex Ms illud iam perspicuum est.
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combines the first part o f the two asswnptiones. The conclusion, introduced
by “from which it is recognized,”3783is clear and in line with Steps I and Π:
“The approbatio is contained in neither the propositio nor the assum ption
By draw ing further on Steps I and II, we easily obtain the follow ing
hypothetical argument.
Step ΠΙ = Inv. 1.66
Propositio: [If 1) in some argum ent the propositio and assw nptio
are sufficient without an approbatio and 2) in another they are weak
unless an approbatio is added, then the approbatio is contained in
neither the propositio nor the asswnptio?*]
[P roposition's a pprobatio : om itted39]
A ssum ptio: But 1) there is some argum ent in w hich neither the
propositio nor the asswnptio needs an approbatio, [and 2) there is
another in which the propositio and the asswnptio lack force in the
absence o f an approbatio.40]
A ssu m p tio n s approbatio: 1) From Steps I and Π, it is obvious
that there is some argument in which neither the propositio nor the
asswnptio needs an approbatio, e.g., the propositio and the
asswnptio in the following argument:
Propositio: If wisdom is to be sought above all, folly is to
be avoided above all.
A ssum ptio: But w isdom is to be sought above all.
Com plexio: Therefore folly is to be avoided above all.
[and 2) it is obvious that there is another in which the propositio and
the asswnptio lack force in the absence o f an approbatio.41]
Com plexio: From which it is recognized that the approbatio is
contained in neither the propositio nor the assw nptio.
Having completed Step ΙΠ o f his argum ent in favor o f a quinquepartite
analysis o f deductive reasoning, Cicero, at the end o f 1.66, states by way o f
conclusion: “And if this is so, those who have divided argum entation into
five parts have divided in a suitable m anner.” The wording o f this
conclusion echoes Cicero’s initial endorsem ent o f the quinquepartite
division in 1.61.42 “Those” in 1.66 has the same reference as “all who take
their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus” in 1.61. A pparently Cicero
believes that the quinquepartite analysis goes back in some im portant way to
the early Peripatos. The correctness o f that belief w ill be discussed in Part
IV o f this paper. For the moment, I w ant to underline that Cicero has been
not only using mixed hypothetical arguments to defend the five part
37 1.66 ex quo cognoscitur.
38 The propositio is not stated, but it is easily supplied by combining the
propositiones of Steps I and Π.
39 On the omission of the propositions approbatio, see note 34.
40 part 2 of the assumptio is not stated in Step III, presuambly because it is
considered obvious. See the assumptions approbatio of both Steps I and II. There it is
said to be obvious that the proposito and the asswnptio sometimes need an approbatio.
41 Concerning the omission of part 2 of the assumptions approbation see the
preceding note.
42 The wording at the end of 1.67— quodsi ita est, commode partiti sunt illi, qui in
quinqué partes tribuerunt argumentationem—recalls the beginning of 1.61: commodior
illa partido videatur esse quae in quinqué partes tributa est, quam omnes ab Aristotele et
Theophrasto profecti maxime secuti sunt.
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division, but also defending a five part division o f this m ode o f argument.
That is clear both from the three examples he gives, one in each o f the three
Steps,43 and from the summary o v e rv ie w ^ parts, w hich follow s
im m ediately (Ded. 4). I have already had occasion to refer to this overview
(above, Part H) and repeat here what is significant. The proposito is
described as that “from which the entire force o f the argument ought to
flow ,” and the asswnptio as that “through which one assum es w hat is
pertinent to showing (or proving the case), (deriving it) from the proposition
(1.67). That is characterization in terms o f hypothetical syllogistic. The
conditional statem ent o f the propostio contains the force o f the argument,44
and the antecedent o f the conditional is adopted in the assumption where it is
asserted categorically.
IV
Cicero tells us that quinquepartite analysis has been adopted by all who
take their their start from A ristotle and Theophrastus. If the argum ent o f Part
ΙΠ is sound, it w ould seem that the analysis in question is a division o f
m ixed hypotheticals. Can that be correct? The Stoics, after all, are known to
have worked extensively on hypothetical syllogistic, and Cicero is likely to
have been influenced by their work. I do not w ant to deny th a t Stoic logic
was im portant in the Hellenistic period; the young Cicero w ill have been
exposed to it through his teachers. But granting that, I w ant to call attention
to the evidence for early Peripatetic w ork on m ixed hypothetical syllogisms.
It is not insignificant; and taken together with passages in On Invention, it
provides good reason to believe what Cicero says, at least in regard to
Theophrastus. Here is the m ost im portant evidence.
In the Prior Analytics, after speaking about argum ents based on
agreem ent and those established per impossible, A ristotle prom ises
discussion o f other kinds o f hypothetical argum ent (1.44 50a39-b2).
A ristotle does not say which lands o f hypothetical argum ent he intends to
discuss, and it seems certain that he never fulfilled his prom ise. It fell to his
successors to develop the subject. A lexander o f A phrodisias reports that
Theophrastus made mention o f the prom ised kinds in his Analytics and
Eudemus did the same. Alexander goes on to list five kinds o f which the
first is the m ixed hypothetical syllogism o f the if-then variety {In AP r p.
390.2-9 = 111E.4-12). Philoponus tells us that lengthy treatises were
w ritten on the subject by Theophrastus, Eudemus and others o f A ristotle’s
pupils, and also by the Stoics {In A P r 242.18-21 = 111B.5-8 FHS&G).
That suggests a substantial discussion o f hypothetical syllogistic by both
Theophrastus and Eudemus, but Boethius says that Theophrastus only
pursued the chief points or elem ents o f the subject, w hile Eudemus
follow ed a broader path, but in such a way that he seems to have sown the
seed w ithout harvesting the crop {Hyp. syll 1.1.3 = 111A.6-10 FHS&G).
W hat Boethius says may be taken to cast doubt on Philoponus ’ reference to
lengthy treatises,45 but it seems quite possible that Boethius is either
43 The first two examples are incomplete in that the conclusion is not stated. In the
third it is stated. For our purposes, the difference is unimportant Each of the arguments
is a crisp, clear mixed hypothetical syllogism, which is used effectively to illustrate a
detail in the larger argument.
44 Hence the argument “from one part,” in which “since” replaces “if”: “Since she
has given birth, she has lain with a man” (1.74). See below, Part IV.
45 Pohlenz vol. 2 p. 29, Michel p. 182-3 and Graeser p.92-3.
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uninform ed or disingenuous concerning the work o f Theophrastus and
Eudemus.46 In any case, setting forth the elem ents o f hypothetical
syllogistic need not, and should not, be thought o f as child’s play. W hat
Theophrastus and Eudemus wrote, w hether com paratively brief or lengthy
as Philoponus reports, w ill have constituted an im portant contribution to die
field o f hypothetical syllogistic. It influenced the developm ent o f Stoic logic
and was taken up by rhetoricians who placed themselves w ithin the
Peripatetic tradition or drew eclectically upon it. Either way, Cicero w ill be
reporting a correct tradition, when he speaks o f those “who take their start
from A ristotle and Theophrastus.”
Not only does Cicero make explicit reference to the founders o f the
Peripatos, but also much o f what is said w ithin the discussion o f deduction
has parallels in latter reports concerning Theophrastus. I shall mention four
parallels. First, we know from A lexander that Theophrastus concerned
him self with hypothetical syllogisms in which either the conditional premise
or the additional premise is doubtful and therefore in need o f proof (in APr
p. 263.11-25 = 112A.22-37 FHS&G). That is, o f course, a m ajor
consideration in Cicero’s argument in favor o f quinquepartite deduction,
especially in Steps I and Π (1.62-5). M oreover, A lexander tells us that the
additional assumption may be posited through induction, or hypothetical
argument, or as obvious, or through a (categorical) syllogism (p. 388.17-20
= 112B.1-3 FHS&G). W e may com pare Step Π o f the argum ent for five
parts. Here Cicero asserts that an assw nptio which is obvious needs no
approbatio and then supports the assertion by adducing a particular example
in which the assumptio, “But one ought to wish to be w ise,” is said to be
obvious (1.65).
Second, Alexander reports that the older men, i.e. the early Peripatetics,
characterized the additional premise as μεταλαμβανόμενον. It is not
posited “from outside” (ού εξωθεν); rather it appears in the conditional
premise, but not in the required form. There it is part o f a hypothetical and a
sequence; it m ust be changed into an assertion when adopted as the
additional prem ise (p. 263.26-36 = 112A.38-49 FHS&G). The idea is the
same in the Ciceronian description o f the assumptio: it does not come “from
outside,” but rather “from the proposition (ex propositions 1.67).
Third, Simplicius reports that “since” (έπεί) is used instead o f “i f ’ (ει)
in hypothetical arguments in which the antecedent is not only true but also
obvious and undisputed. W e arc also told that the younger m en, i.e. the
Stoics, call this kind o f proposition “parasynaptic” and that Theophrastus,
in his Prior Analytics, made clear the reason for using “since” (In D e cáelo
p. 552.31-553.4 = 112C.1-5 FHS&G). Concerning the Stoics w e are well
enough informed. They distinguished between the synaptic conjunction,
“if,” which announces sequence, and the parasynaptic conjunction, “since,”
which announces both sequence and fact (Diogenes Laertius 7.71).47 In
regard to Theophrastus we are less well informed; but if Sim plicius has not
m isrepresented him, he w ill have offered a reason for using “since.”
Perhaps he emphasized economy, pointing out that “since” introduces the
46 Here as elsewhere in this paragraph I am drawing on Barnes p. 125-9. His fuller
statement should be consulted, as should that of Prantl p. 375-89.
47 D L. 7.71 : επαγγέλλεται δ ’ δ σύνδεσμος (sc. επεί) άκολουθεΐν τε τδ δεύτερον τφ
πρώτφ και τδ πρώτον ύφεστδναι: “The <parasynaptio conjunction <‘since‘> announces
that the second follows the first and the first is fact.” I.e., the consequent follows on the
antecedent, and the antecedent is fact. Diogenes cites the Stoic Crinis as his source (SVF
vol. 3 p. 269.1-6).
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antecedent as fact, so that the additional premise o f the conditional
hypothetical argument need not be stated. J f he did say that, he m ay have
added that the use o f “since” also removes the need to state the conclusion
separately. For what would be the consequent in a conditional hypothetical
(i.e., in the synaptic) now expresses the conclusion. Be that as it m ay,48 we
have in Cicero a clear example o f “since” replacing “if.”49 It is not found
w ithin C icero’s argument in favor o f five parts (Ded. 3 ), but in the later list
o f illustrative arguments, each o f which has a different num ber o f parts
(Ded. 5). I am thinking o f the last exam ple, i.e., that o f an argum ent with
one part: “Since she has given birth, she has lain w ith a man” (1.74).50 In
expression (diction), the argument differs little from the conditional
propositio “If she has given birth, she has lain w ith a m an.” The only
difference is that “since” (quoniam) has been substituted for “i f ’ (si). But
“since” announces the truth o f the antecedent, i.e. she has in fa c t given
birth, and that makes the complex statement a clear argum ent which needs
no supplem ent.51
Fourth, we should remember that m ixed hypothetical syllogism s come
in several varieties. In A lexander’s list o f kinds passed over by A ristotle but
m entioned by Theophrastus and Eudemus, the conditional hypothetical
com es first and the separative comes second (In A P r p. 390.9-10 = 111E.648
In his Introduction to Logic 3.3 = 11 ID. 1-13 FHS&G, Galen tells us that the
older Peripatetics called a conditional premise “hypothetical by connection/* He also
comments that either εί or ειπερ may introduce the antecedent. We can say confidently
that Theophrastus belongs among the older Peripatetics who spoke of “hypothetical by
connection.” Less clear to me is whether Galen’s comment concerning the use of εί or
ειπερ would be endorsed by Theophrastus in all contexts. In a logical treatise, he might
well treat εί and ειπερ as identical and contrast both with έπεί, but in a rhetorical context
he may have taken note of the fact that ειπερ can be used in two different ways: either as a
strengthened form of εί or as a subtle synonym for έπεί. I.e., ειπερ may be used in order
to imply, without announcing, the truth of die antecedent. See LSJ&M s.v. Π, and
Galen's own use of ειπερ at the end of 3.3 = 111D.12 (assuming Keiffer's emendation is
correct).
491 cite the example found within the treatment of deduction (1.74). If we consider
earlier remarks on arguments which are probable, we may cite a second example. For
there (1.47) a distinction is drawn between a “true” argument and a plausible one. The
form»* is illustrated by “Since there is a scar, there was a wound,” and the latter by “If
there is much dust on his shoes, he must have come from a journey.” In the former case,
we have an argument which has been discovered (inventum) by considering causation (cf.
1.37), and it is called “true” because the antecedent is announced as fact. That does not
change the status of the argument from probable to necessary. It still may be that no
wound (understood to be damage inflicted by an external agent) occurred (or was inflicted).
The scar may be the result of, e.g., a disease which caused the skin to erupt
5 0 1.74 quoniam peperit, cum viro concubuit.
51
Schweinfurth-Walla p. 162 explains the argument as a two part inference, whose
propositio is not expressly formulated and whose assumptio and complexio are brought
together in a single sentence. Out of all context, I have no quarrel with this analysis, but
for our purposes it is important to underline the fact that Cicero is introducing a complex
proposition which was formally recognized by the Stoics (it belongs among τα ούχ άπλα
αξιώματα and is labeled παρασυνημμένον, Diogenes Laertius 7.71) and discussed by the
early Peripatetics including Theophrastus. Moreover, a close relationship between the
synaptic and parasynaptic proposition was recognized. In Diogenes Laertius, they are
discussed one after the other (7.71); and Simplicius, having introduced the synaptic to
elucidate the parasynaptic, refers to the first part of the parasynaptic proposition as the
antecedent (In De cáelo p. 553.1 = 112C.1 FHS&G and p. 553.11 which is not printed in
FHS&G).
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8 FHS&G). According to Galen, “separative” is the term used by the older
philosophers, i.e. the Peripatetics. The m ore recent philosophers, i.e. the
Stoics, called it “disjunctive”.52 Both schools were concerned with
arguments in which the hypothetical prem ise has the form “either—or”
(ήτοι—ή). G alen’s example opposes day and night: “Either it is day, or it is
night” (Introduction to Logic 3.3-4 = 1 1 1D .3-18 FHS& G). Put
schematically, the argument in its entirety runs as follows: “Either P or Q,
but P, therefore not Q” (“but not P, therefore Q”). This kind o f hypothetical
argum ent appears in C icero’s list o f illustrative argum ents (Ded. 5). H is
example is “Either we ought to fear the Carthaginians, if we leave them
unharmed, or we ought to destroy their city; but assuredly w e ought not to
fear them; it rem ains, therefore, that we ought to destroy their city”
(1.72).53
These four parallels, in com bination w ith two references to those who
take their start from the A ristotle and Theophrastus (1.61,66), are, I think,
reason to say that the discussion o f deduction in On Invention contains
evidence for early Peripatetic work on hypothetical syllogistic and its
influence throughout the Hellenistic period. That is not to claim direct
knowledge o f Theophrastus (and Eudemus) on the part o f the young
Cicero. W hether in his teens or early tw enties,54 Cicero was not reading
difficult Peripatetic texts, which in any case may have been unavailable, or
largely so, in Rome at that time.55 R ather Cicero was dependent on his
teachers o f rhetoric and the handbooks they recommended. These sources
w ere, however, influenced by the early Peripatetics and that influence was
acknowledged. W hen Cicero names A ristotle and Theophrastus, he is
follow ing his source(s), teacher or handbook, and the argum ent which
occurs between the first and second reference to these Peripatetics reflects
early Peripatetic thinking.56 The argum ent is well structured and in that
regard quite different from the illustrative argument o f the preceding
re p o rt57 M y guess is that this difference is attributable to C icero’s handling
52 Strictly speaking “separative” and “disjunctive” characterize the hypothetical
premise: for the Peripatetics it is a πρότασις υποθετική κατά διαίρεσιν; for the Stoics, a
διεζευγμένόν αξίωμα (Galen, Introd. 3.4 = 11 ID. 17-18).
53 1.72 out metuamus Carthaginienses oportet, si incólumes eos reliquerimus, aut
eorum urbem diruamus. at metuere qiddem non oportet, restât igitur, ut urbem diruamus.
54 See note 1.
55 We may regard with scepticism the story of Theophrastus' library—i.e. his books
and those of Aristotle were carried off to Scepsis, then back to Athens and finally to
Renne where they w oe eventually published by Andronicus some time after the middle of
the 1st c. B.C. (Strabo, Geography 13.1.54 and Plutarch, Sulla 26.1-3 = 37-8
FHS&G)—and still hold that the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus were largely
unavailable in Rome, when Cicero composed On Invention, i.e., between c. 90 and 80
B.C. But certainty here is elusive, so that differing views are to be expected. Cf. Schmidt
p. 18-19, who believes, partly on the basis of On Invention 1.61, that Theophrastus’
rhetorical works were known to educated men in Rome before Sulla brought the Library
of Theophrastus to the city in 83 B.C.
56 In the example within Step I, Rome is paired with Athens. The pairing is not
early Peripatetic; mostly likely the rhetorical source followed by Cicero contained the
pair, but it is possible that Cicero introduced it himself. In any case, what is being
illustrated, an obvious premise, and the form of the illustration, a mixed hypothetical, are
entirely in place in a source which claims roots in the early Peripatos.
5' I n tiiis way it differs also from the illustrative argument which follows in 1.68-9.
See above, note 28.
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o f sources. The reasoning o f the advocates o f five parts—reasoning which
we m ight expect to occur as part o f the preceding report (Ded. 2)— has been
carefully reproduced under the guise o f C icero’s own explanation for
preferring quinquepartite analysis (Ded. 3). B ut w hether o r not Cicero is
disingenious, his explanation is evidence both for early Peripatetic w ork on
hypothetical syllogistic and for its influence among rhetoricians o f the
H ellenistic period.
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